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The proceedings brought against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, 
William Ruto for post-election election violence in 2007 by the International 
Criminal Court has resulted in action by the African Union that undermines 
individual criminal responsibility for heads of state and government officials and for 
the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. This thesis will assess 
whther the African Union’s decision to not cooperate with the International Criminal 
Court, and the adoption of Article 46A Bis of the Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is unlawful 
under the principles of international law. This thesis will also assess how these 
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Chapter One:  
1. Introduction 
The African Union made a decision about the International Criminal Court at its 
extraordinary summit on 12 October 2013 that no criminal charges can be brought 
against a sitting head of state or government.1 Following this decision, the African 
Union adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights2 (the Protocol on Amendments) to merge 
the African Court on Human and People’s Rights and the African Court of Justice at 
the 23rd Ordinary Summit of the AU in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in June 2014. 
Article 46A Bis of the Protocol on Amendments provides immunity for serving 
heads of state and senior government officials. 
The decision about the ICC and the adoption of Article 46A Bis by the African 
Union reflect the tension between the principles of sovereignty and the duty to 
prosecute those that commit crimes under international law. The AU’s actions are 
contrary to the well-established rule in both customary international law and treaty 
law, that head of state immunity cannot be invoked when an individual is alleged to 
have committed a crime under international law. Despite this, the AU actions point to 
the unwillingness of African states to hold individuals in positions of power 
accountable for gross human rights violations on a continent where the rights of 
victims are not upheld.  
The African Union’s decision on the ICC and Article 46A Bis can be considered to 
be in violation of various principles of international law and international treaties. 
Firstly, the African Union decision and Article 46A Bis are in violation of states’ 
duty to prosecute individuals who commit international crimes. Secondly the 
decision and Article 46A Bis is in violation of customary international law, 
specifically Article 27 of the Rome Statute, which states that official capacity as a 
Head of State or a member of government shall not exempt a person from criminal 
                                                          
1 Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 12 October 2013, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 




responsibility. Thirdly, the decision and the adoption of the Protocol on Amendments 
is in direct violation of the Constitutive Act which aims to promote and protect 
human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments and to reject impunity. 
This thesis will conclude that the African Union’s actions are unlawful under 
international law. It will also conclude that and Article 46A Bis which provides that 
heads of state and government officials are immune to criminal prosecution at the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights will promote impunity and will 
undermine efforts to promote and protect human rights in Africa.  
1.1 The African Union’s Decision on its relationship with International Criminal 
Court 
Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation 
proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
court. On 31 March 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber authorised the Prosecutor to 
investigate the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. Charges were brought against 
six Kenyan citizens accused of being responsible for the violence. The current head 
of state, Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Samoei Ruto stand accused of being 
criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrators pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the 
Rome Statute for crimes against humanity. Kenyatta faces charges of murder3, 
deportation or forcible transfer of population4, rape5, persecution6 and other 
inhumane acts7. Ruto faces charges of murder, deportation or forcible transfer of 
population and persecution. 
                                                          
3 Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  
4 Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
5 Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
6 Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
7 Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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On 11 and 12 October 2013, the African Union made a decision about its relationship 
with the International Criminal Court at an Extraordinary Summit8 in Addis Ababa.9 
The key points of the AU Assembly decision10 are the following: 
1. In order to safeguard the constitutional order, stability and integrity of the 
member states, no charges shall be commenced or continued before any 
international court or tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or 
government.  
2. The trials of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto should be suspended 
until they complete their term of office.  
3.  The process to expand the mandate of the African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights (AFCHPR) to try international crimes should be fast tracked. 
4. The Commission should expedite the process of expansion of AFCHPR to 
deal with international crimes in accordance with the relevant decision of the 
Policy Organs and invites member states to support this process. 
5. African states parties had proposed relevant amendments to the Rome Statute 
in accordance with article 121 of the Statute.11 
6. African states parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC are requested to inscribe 
on the agenda the issue of indictment of African sitting heads of state and 
government by the ICC and its consequences on peace, stability and 
reconciliation at the forth coming sessions of the Members of the Bureau of 
the Assembly of States Parties. 
                                                          
8 Under Article 6 of the 2000 Constitutive Act, the Assembly meets at least once a year in ordinary 
session. At the request of any member state and on approval by a two thirds majority of the 
Member states, the Assembly shall meet in extra ordinary session.  
9 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec. 
1(Oct.2013), Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 12 October 2013, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia 
10 Article 7 (1) of the Constitutive Act states that the Assembly shall take decisions by consensus, or 
failing which, by two-thirds majority of the member states of the Union.  
11 On 22 November 2013, Kenya submitted proposed amendments to the Rome Statute in 
accordance with Article 121 of the Rome Statute which provides that after the expiry of seven years 
from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text 
of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who 
shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties. Kenya proposed amendments to Article 27 to exempt 
sitting heads of state and their duties exemption from prosecution during their current terms of 
office (Submission by the Republic of Kenya on Amendments to Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court for Consideration by the Working Group on Amendments. C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-
XVIII.10. 14 March 2014) 
9 
7. Any AU member state that wishes to refer a case to the ICC may inform and
seek the advice of the AU.
8. Kenya should send a letter to the UN Security Council requesting for deferral
in conformity with Article 16 of the Rome Statute in the cases of Kenyatta
and Ruto.
The decision reaffirmed the Assembly’s dissatisfaction with the ICC and the threat to 
African sovereignty. In the preamble of the AU’s decision, the organisation 
reaffirmed its conviction against the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction 
and the activities of the ICC because its methods impede and jeopardize efforts to 
promote lasting peace. It reiterated that it was concerned about the “politicisation and 
misuse” of indictments against sitting African leaders, specifically the unprecedented 
proceedings against heads of state by the ICC. It also underscored that the 
unprecedented indictments of both Kenyatta and Ruto, could potentially undermine 
the sovereignty, stability and peace in Kenya and in other member states, as well as 
reconciliation, reconstruction and the normal functioning of constitutional 
institutions. The AU also reaffirmed the principles of state immunity as derived from 
international customary law.12  
1.2  ICC Proceedings against Kenya: 
The announcement of the 27 December 2007 presidential election results triggered 
widespread violence in Kenya which lasted from December 2007 to January 2008. 
Opposition leader of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Raila Ondinga and 
his supporters rejected the election victory of Party of National Unity (PNU) leader 
Mwai Kibaki, claimed that the electoral process was fraudulent. More than 1133 
people were killed and 600 000 civilians displaced. Evidence surfaced that the ethnic 
violence was pre-meditated by ODM leaders who were accused of murder, rape, 
deportation of forcible transfer of the population and other inhumane acts.13 The 
12 Preamble of the Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec. 1(Oct.2013), Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 12 
October 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
13 Human Rights Watch ‘Kenya: Prosecute Perpetrators of Post-Election Violence’ 9 December 2011. 
Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/kenya-prosecute-perpetrators-post-
election-violence, accessed on 12 December 2013 
10 
 
failure of the government to prosecute post-election violence crimes led to the 
intervention of the ICC. 
As previously stated, pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC granted the Prosecutor’s request to investigate the post-election 
violence in Kenya. The Chamber had to consider three circumstances that would 
allow for the Prosecutor to investigate the case. These circumstances are provided for 
in Article 53 of the Statute.  
The first circumstance that the Chamber had to consider was whether there was a 
reasonable basis that a crime under the jurisdiction of the court has been committed. 
Pursuant to Article 53(a), the Prosecutor should consider the information available to 
determine whether a crime under the jurisdiction of the court had been committed. A 
crime falls under the jurisdiction of the court if it falls within the crimes listed in 
Article 5, namely the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
the crime of aggression. It must also fulfil the temporal requirements under Article 
11 which provides that the court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
committed after the entry into force of the Statute.  
Based on the available information, the Chamber found that there was reasonable 
basis to believe that crimes against humanity had been committed on the territory of 
Kenya,14 specifically murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, forcible 
transfer of population and other inhumane acts.15  It held the view that a number of 
attacks were planned, directed or organised by various groups which included local 
leaders, businessmen, members of the police force and politicians affiliated to the 
ODM and PNU.16  
The second circumstance provided for under Article 53(b) is that the case should or 
would be admissible under Article 17(1) of the Statute. A case is therefore deemed to 
be inadmissible when the conditions listed in Article 17 have been met. These are: 
                                                          
14 International Criminal Court, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya.  ICC-01/09-19 para 73 
15 Ibid para 102 




(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution. 
(b) The case has been investigated by a state which has jurisdiction over it and 
the state has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely to 
prosecute. 
(c) Person has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint  
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action of the court. 
The Chamber’s admissibility test refers to the admissibility of one or more potential 
cases within the context of the given situation. Two elements must therefore be 
considered. The first is to consider the groups of persons involved that are likely to 
be the object of an investigation, and second is to consider the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court that have allegedly been committed during the incidents that 
are likely to be the focus of an investigation. Information provided by the Prosecutor 
is therefore assessed to determine whether these elements have been satisfied.17   
With regard to Article 17(1)(a) and (b), the Chamber had to consider the Prosecutors 
submissions with regard to national proceedings in Kenya and third parties for 
perpetrators of post-election violence. At the time, there had been an indication that 
the Kenyan government wanted to establish a special tribunal that would prosecute 
perpetrators of the post-election violence. The Kenyan government also regularly 
promised to prosecute perpetrators in national courts. This tribunal and these national 
trials, however, never materialised and therefore there were no domestic proceedings 
being initiated in Kenya, nor was there a prospect that such proceedings would take 
place in the near future.18 On 18 February 2010, the Prosecutor further submitted that 
there were no domestic proceedings either in Kenya or a third state with respect to 
leaders associated with the PNU and ODM. The Chamber therefore saw this as an 
                                                          
17 Ibid para 182 
18 Ibid para 183 
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indication of reluctance from the Kenyan authorities to address the potential 
responsibility of those who are likely to be the focus of the court’s investigation.19  
With regard to the last condition under Article 17(1)(d), the Chamber had to first 
consider whether persons or groups of persons that are likely to be the object of an 
investigation include those who may bear the greatest responsibility for the alleged 
crimes committed and second, the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed within 
the incidents which are likely to be the object of the investigation. Factors guiding 
this determination were the scale, nature, manner of commission, impact of crimes 
committed on victims and the existence of aggravating circumstances.20 The 
Chamber held that the supporting material submitted by the Prosecutor showed that 
groups of persons likely to be the focus of the Prosecutor’s investigations would be 
high ranking officials and their alleged role in the post-election violence. Therefore 
the first element of gravity was satisfied. With regard to the second element, the 
Chamber considered the scale of the violence with regard number of deaths, burned 
houses and displaced people. The crimes also had an element of brutality, such as 
burning victims alive and beheadings.21 This therefore satisfied the gravity threshold 
of Article 17(d). 
The third circumstance, as provided for under Article 53(c), states that the 
Prosecutor, taking onto account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, 
there are substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice. The Chamber, however, considered that a review of this 
requirement was not necessary with regard to this case because the Prosecutor had 
not determined that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice, which 
would not prevent him from proceeding with a request for authorisation of an 
investigation.22   
                                                          
19 Ibid para 184 
20Ibid  para 188 
21 Ibid para 199 
22 Ibid para 6 
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As a result of the above circumstances, the Chamber, therefore, granted the 
prosecutor authorisation to investigate the situation in Kenya based on the above 
mentioned reasons.  
1.3 Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and Kenya 
The AU and Kenya have both tried to adopt measures that would remove Kenyatta 
and Ruto from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Firstly, as provided for by Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute, the AU and Kenyan government appealed to the UN Security 
Council to halt the investigation and prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto. Secondly, the 
Kenyan parliament passed a motion to withdraw from the Rome Statute. It is 
therefore important to determine whether the withdrawal of Kenya from the Rome 
Statute will have any effect over the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with its trial 
against Kenyatta and Ruto or Kenya’s obligations under the Rome Statute.  
1.4 Article 16 and the United Nations Security Council 
The AU and the Kenyan government requested the United Nations Security Council 
to defer the investigation and prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto for a period of 12 
months in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute. The decision to defer an 
investigation or proceedings is vested in the United Nations Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This therefore means that the UNSC should consider 
whether a pending case in the ICC would pose a threat to international peace and 
security.  
In September 2013, Al-Shabaab militia stormed the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, killing 
67 people. The terrorist attack targeted expatriates and members of the diplomatic 
corps, and was launched in response to Kenya’s intervention in Somalia in 2012. The 
attack in Nairobi created an opportunity for Kenyatta and Ruto to question the 
legitimacy of the ICC proceedings during their terms in office. Kenya and the AU 
argued that the proceedings would ‘distract and prevent’ Kenyatta and Ruto from 
fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities.23  Another request was submitted to the 
                                                          
23 Preamble of the Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec. 1(Oct.2013) Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 12 
October 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia para 6 
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UN Security Council to have the case postponed under Article 16 on the basis that 
the proceedings interfered with Kenya’s ability to respond to the attacks and that this 
was a threat to international peace and security.  
On 15 November 2012, the Security Council failed to adopt the resolution which 
sought the deferral of the Kenyan leaders’ ICC trials.24 The rejection of the deferral 
suggests that the UN Security Council failed to determine that the Westgate Mall 
attack posed a threat to international peace. The United Kingdom representative, for 
example stated that the sponsors had failed to establish that the Charter VII threshold 
beyond which the Court’s proceedings against the Kenyan leaders would pose a 
threat to international peace.25 United States representative, Ambassador Samantha 
Power stated that the families of the victims of the 2008 post-election violence had 
already waited for longer than five years for judicial proceedings to begin. She 
emphasised that the justice for the victims was critical to the country’s long-term 
peace and security and that it was imperative that the international community 
support accountability for those responsible for crimes against humanity.26  
Considering the powers of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and the wording of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, it could be argued that 
this provision is meant to be a temporary measure. It therefore cannot be used to 
discontinue an investigation or proceeding in the Court. It could also be argued that 
such a request would only be granted in the most exceptional of circumstances. Had 
the Kenyan request been successful, it may have weakened the ICC’s ability to 
prosecute heads of states and other government officials as it would have set a 
precedent to allow individuals, specifically heads of states and government delay 
court proceedings at the ICC. 
24 Security Council 7060th Meeting, ‘Security Council Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders’ 
Trial Fails to Win Adoption with 7 Voting in Favour, 8 Abstaining’ SC/11176 15 November 2013 
25 Ibid 
26 United States Mission to the United Nations ‘Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Samantha Power, 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on Kenya’s International Criminal Court Article 
16 Deferral Request, November 15, 2013. Available online at 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/217614.htm, accessed on 10 July 2014 
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1.5 Kenya’s Motion to Withdraw from the ICC 
In September 2013, the Kenyan Parliament approved a motion to withdraw from the 
ICC. A Bill is currently being drafted by the Kenyan Attorney General to repeal the 
International Crimes Act 1998, which incorporated the Rome Statute into Kenya’s 
domestic law. There is, however no legal basis for this decision under international 
law, specifically under the Rome Statute.27  
A state may withdraw from the Rome Statute, as provided for by Article 127.28 A 
withdrawal does not, however, relieve the State from any of its obligations of the 
Statute whilst it was a state party. The State is therefore still obligated to cooperate 
with the court in connection with any criminal investigations and proceedings that it 
has a duty to cooperation with and that had commenced prior to the date the 
withdrawal came in to effect. This means that even of Kenya were to withdraw from 
the Statute, it would still have to fulfil its duty to cooperate with the investigations 
and proceedings of Kenyatta and Ruto. 
One could also argue that the intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute is in 
violation of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states 
that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith. Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the court shall have 
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern and states party to the Statute accept the jurisdiction of the 
court with regards to the crimes referred to in Article 5.29 Withdrawing from the 
statute in an attempt to avoid the jurisdiction of the court and the prosecution of 
Kenyatta and Ruto could be considered to be in bad faith.  
The Bill to repeal the International Crimes Act would also not have any effect on 
Kenya’s duties under international law. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
                                                          
27 F Biketi ‘Bill to withdraw Kenya from Rome Statute cooking at AG’ Standard Digital 20 October 
2013. Available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000095837, accessed on 17 January 
2014. 
28 Article 127(1) provides that a state may withdraw from the statute by written notification to the 
UN. The withdrawal shall take place effect one year after the date of receipt, unless the notification 
specifies a later date. 
29 Article 11 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. One could therefore argue that 
any changes that the Kenyan government makes to its municipal laws will on no way 
have an effect on its obligations under the Rome Statute. It would also not limit the 
court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over Kenyatta and Ruto.  
This thesis will argue that the attempts by the Kenyan government and the AU to 
disrupt the ICC investigations and proceedings of Kenyatta and Ruto can be 
considered to be contrary to the duty of states to prosecute individuals who commit 
crimes under international law and the rule that immunity cannot be granted when 
international crime has been committed.  
1.6 Merging the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court 
of Justice 
The decision to combine the African Court of Justice and the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights was made during a meeting in Addis Abba in July 2004 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union. This was 
prompted by the need to make the two existing Protocols for the African Court of 
Justice and the African Court of Human and People’s Rights more efficient by 
pooling resources onto one judicial organ.  When this protocol comes into force, the 
African Court of Justice and Human and People’s Right’s will be the main judicial 
organ of the African Union and that the court will be constituted and function in 
accordance with the Statute.30  
1.6.1 Article 46A of the Protocol on the Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute 
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
At the 23rd Ordinary Session of the African Union in Malabo, the Protocol on the 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (The Protocol on Amendments) was adopted.31 Members were also 
called upon to speedily sign and ratify the legal instrument. The adoption of Protocol 
on Amendments undoubtedly comes of the heel of the AU decision on the ICC, and 
                                                          
30 Article 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted 
1 July 2008 




the cases brought against Kenyatta, Ruto and the Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir.32 
Members of the AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments which extends the 
jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Article 46A bis of the Protocol Amendments, 
however, states that “no charges shall be commenced or continue before the court 
against any serving African Union Head of State or government, or anybody acting 
or entitled to act in such a capacity, or other senior State officials base on their 
functions, during the tenure of office.” Heads of state and senior government 
officials are therefore immune from being persecuted by the court for genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The decision of the AU on the ICC and the adoption of the Protocols on the 
Amendment can be constituted as being contrary to principles of international law, 
mainly because heads of state and governments officials are not entitled to immunity 
with regards to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 33  
Chapter two of this thesis will examine the principles of individual criminal 
responsibility and state immunity to determine whether or not the proceeding brought 
against Kenyatta and Ruto are consistent with international law. 
Chapter three of this thesis will consider the proceedings brought against Kenyatta 
and Ruto with regards to the concept of sovereignty and the universal nature of 
human rights. This chapter will consider the relationship between the principle of 
sovereignty and state obligations to victims of gross human rights violations. 
In Chapter four, I will look at the challenges faced by Africa’s current human rights 
system. It will determine that a lack of cooperation with the ICC and non-compliance 
with the Rome Statute will further frustrate the continent’s ability to grant justice and 
                                                          
32 The ICC has brought a case against President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir for genocide and war 
crimes committed in Darfur.  
33 Article 27 the Rome Statute provides that states that official capacity as a Head of State or a 
member of government shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility, specifically for the 




redress to victims of human rights violations and will further weaken Africa’s human 
rights mechanisms to promote and protect human rights.  
Chapter five of this thesis will firstly consider the legality of the AU’s decision on 
the ICC as a regional body on the international plane. It will consider the 
consequences in international law of the decisions or resolutions passed by a regional 
body. Secondly it will argue that the actions of the AU are in contravention of the 
Constitutive Act and provisions of the Rome Statute. Thirdly, it will determine that 
Kenya’s actions are in contravention of Kenya’s regional and international 
obligations to fight impunity and hold individuals responsible for committing 
















2. State Immunity and Individual Criminal Responsibility
The AU decision on Africa’s relationship with the ICC underscores that it is the first 
time that a sitting head of state and his deputy have had criminal proceedings brought 
against them in an international court.34 The decision further requests that the trials 
of Kenyatta and Ruto should be suspended until they complete their terms of office.35 
. It further adopted the Protocol on the Amendments for Protocol of the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights which grants sitting heads of states and 
government officials’ immunity from prosecution in the Court.  It is therefore 
important to consider the principles of individual criminal responsibility and state 
immunity to determine whether or not the proceeding brought against Kenyatta and 
Ruto are consistent with international law.  
2.1. State Immunity under International Law 
Sovereign equality is a fundamental principle in international law. This is confirmed 
in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter and reaffirmed in the Friendly Relations 
Declarations of the General Assembly of 1970. State immunity flows from the 
concept of sovereignty. As a general rule in customary international law, states are 
immune from the jurisdiction of the national courts of another state.36  
Sovereign immunity is based on two major principles. The first principle is that 
states share a status of equality and therefore cannot have their disputes settled in one 
another’s courts.37 The second principle is that of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states.38 Domestic courts can therefore not make a foreign sovereign 
party subject to legal proceedings against its will.  
State practice, in the form of national legislation and municipal court decisions, has 
shown that the states have adopted a doctrine of restrictive immunity which only 
34 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), para 5. 
35 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC) para 10(ii). 
36 Article 5 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property 
37 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 5ed (1998) 327
38 Brownlie 328 
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allows immunity for acts of government (jure imperii) and not commercial acts (jure 
gestionis)39. The UN Convention Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property40 codified the restrictive immunity doctrine in Article 10. Restrictive 
immunity restricts the absolute nature of state immunity with regards to various acts.  
2.1.1 Immunity and acts jure imperii in Domestic Courts 
There have been a number of cases that have had to consider the rules of state 
immunity, specifically with regards to human rights violations. Despite the jus 
cogens nature of the crimes allegedly committed by Kenyatta and Ruto, they cannot 
be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign domestic court because of the principle of 
state immunity. 
 In Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, for example, the applicant argued that the act of 
torture had acquired the status of a jus cogens norm in international law and therefore 
took precedence over treaty law and other rules of international law.41 The Court, 
however, held that a state should be granted immunity even when acts of torture have 
been committed.42 In the Arrest Warrant case, Belgium argued that national court 
judgements supported the contention that immunity could be withheld with regard to 
serious crimes under international law.43 The Court held that sitting heads of state, 
government and foreign ministers enjoyed immunity from criminal proceedings 
before foreign domestic courts even when they had committed crimes under 
international law.44 In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State where the Court had to 
consider whether Italian domestic courts breached the principle of state immunity by 
allowing Italian nationals to bring cases against Germany for human rights violations 
during World War II.45 Italy argued that it was justified to deny immunity to 
Germany because the nature of the acts that the nationals were bringing before the 
court. It argued that international law does not accord immunity to states when it has 
                                                          
39 Such an example is the United States Foreign Sovereign Act 1976 and the United Kingdom State 
Immunity Act 1978 
40 The Convention was adopted on 2 December 2004 but has not yet come into force.  
41 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, 21 November 
2001, 35763/97 para 57 
42 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom supra (n41) at para 61 
43 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000(Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) Judgement I.C.J. Reports 
2002, p. 3   para 56 
44 Arrest Warrant supra (n43) at para 58  
45 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Judgement, I.C.J Reports 2012 99 para 51  
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committed serious violations of international humanitarian law.46 The Court 
therefore had to consider whether the jus cogens nature Germany’s acts displaced its 
entitlement to state immunity. It ultimately held that state practice did not support the 
notion that a state was not entitled immunity when it had committed serious human 
rights violations and therefore could not be considered to be part of customary 
international law. State practice showed that international customary law does not 
treat a state’s entitlement to immunity as dependent upon was the gravity of the act 
which it was accused of on the peremptory nature of the rule it allegedly violated.47 
Under these circumstances, there was no conflict between the rule of jus cogens, 
which was a substantive issue and the rule of state immunity, which was a procedural 
issue. That is because the rules of state immunity are meant to determine whether the 
courts of one state may exercise jurisdiction on another state and not whether the 
conduct being considered is lawful or unlawful.48 Therefore, it was determined that 
Italy breached its obligations under international law by denying Germany the 
immunity that is owed to it.49 
2.1.2 International Tribunals and Jurisdiction 
The rules that govern the jurisdiction of national courts with regard to crimes under 
international law are, however, not the same as those that govern the jurisdiction of 
international courts and tribunals. It can be argued that state immunity can be 
revoked when an individual who is representing a state commits crimes under 
international law when that international court has the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction.  
In Arrest Warrant, the relationship between an individual who had official capacity 
and the state was considered by the court. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
brought a case before Belgium concerning an arrest warrant against Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Abdulaye Yerodia Nolombasi for crimes against humanity. Congo 
argued that Belgium violated the principle that a state may not exercise authority on 
the territory of another state and the principle of sovereign equality among all 
                                                          
46 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State paras 80-81 
47 Jurisdictional Immunities of the States supra (n45) at paras 83-84 
48 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State supra (n45) at paras 92-93 
49 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State supra (n45) at para 107 
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members of the UN.  The court had to determine whether Belgium had jurisdiction 
under international law in relation to the subject matter.  After considering state 
practice, the court held that there was no rule under customary law where there is a 
form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability to incumbent state officials where they are suspected of having 
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. It also held that there was no rule 
that enabled foreign national courts to exercise jurisdiction over individuals with 
official capacity that had allegedly committed crimes under international law.  
Therefore, Belgium could not exercise its jurisdiction over the DRC’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs based on the notion that he has committed a crime under 
international law. 
Arrest Warrant affirmed that immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual 
criminal responsibility are two separate concepts.50 On the one hand, state immunity 
flows from the principle of sovereign states. This principle provides that a state may 
not exercise jurisdiction over another state in its domestic courts. On the other hand, 
individual criminal responsibility refers to the obligations international law places on 
individuals not to commit international crimes. State immunity can therefore be 
invoked when an individual is subject to criminal proceedings before a national court 
but not when that individual is subject to proceedings in an international court that 
has jurisdiction.  
2.2 Individual Criminal Responsibility under international law 
International law imposes rights and duties not only on states, but also on 
individuals. Noting the concern that international law produced no punishment for 
actors within sovereign states who committed offences against the law of nations and 
the law of wars.51 The Nuremburg judgement held that crimes against international 
law were committed by “men and not abstract entities” and that international law 
could only be enforced by punishing individuals who committed such crimes,52 
specifically crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity as stated 
                                                          
50 Arrest Warrant  supra (n43) para 61 
51 International Militrary Tribunal Judgement of 1 October 1946. The Trial of German Major War 
Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany. Part 22, 
22 August 1946 – 1 October 1946, para 446  
52 Nuremberg judgement supra (n51) at para 447 
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in the Nuremberg Charter.53 Article 7 of the Nuremburg Charter provided that the 
official position of a defendant did not exempt that individual from criminal 
responsibility. This included head of state or responsible officials in government 
departments.  
The Nuremburg Charter has since become part of international law. In 1946 its 
principles were adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 95(1).54 These 
principles have also been adopted in the statues of previous international tribunals 
and hybrid courts such as the ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL, and the Genocide 
Convention55. Article 25 of the Rome Statute reflects these principles of customary 
international law with regard to individual criminal responsibility. It provides that an 
individual who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the court shall be held 
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with the statute.  
2.2.1 Personal Immunity  
Ratione personae immunity arises from customary international law and the 
principle of sovereign equality. It is attached to an individual by virtue of his or her 
office and confers immunity on to that individual from civil, criminal and 
administrative jurisdiction. Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae from the exercise of foreign 
criminal jurisdiction.56 In the Arrest Warrant case, the court held that it was firmly 
established that certain holders of high-ranking office in a state enjoy immunities 
from jurisdiction in other states.57 Immunity ratione personae covers all acts, 
whether private or official, during or prior to their term of office.58  
 
                                                          
53 Article 6 (a)-(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 8 August 1946. 
54 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal A/Res/1/95, 11 December 1946.  
55 Article 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides 
that persons who commit genocide or any other acts enumerated in the Convention shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.  
56 International Law Commission Report on the work of its sixty-fifth session on 6 May to 7 June and 
8 July to 9 August 2013, No. 10 (A/68/10) para 49 
57 Arrest Warrant supra (n43) at para 51 
58 Article 4(2) of the International Law Commissions’ Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials 
from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 2013 
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 Head of state immunity is generally accepted as absolute with regard to criminal 
proceedings in foreign domestic courts. In the Gaddafi case, the French domestic 
courts tried to prosecute former Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi in connection 
with a bomb attack on a French DC-10 airliner over the Niger in 1989. The French 
Court de Cassation affirmed that unless there was a contrary international provision 
which was binding on the two parties involved,  international customary law 
prohibits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over foreign heads of state in office.59 
Serving heads of state and other government officials may only be prosecuted in 
international tribunals when it is provided for in that tribunal’s statute.60  Immunity 
Ratione personae, however, ceases once the state official has vacated the office and 
is then replaced by immunity ratione materiae.  
Ratione materiae is a functional immunity and covers state officials from foreign 
jurisdiction for official acts performed in the discharge of their mandate.61 State 
officials can therefore not be held accountable for acts performed in an official 
capacity.62 Immunity ratione materiae continues after the individual ceases to hold 
office. 
2.2.2 Criminal Individual Responsibility and Head of State Immunity in International 
Law 
It is an established rule in customary international law that there immunity cannot be 
invoked when the individual has committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide in an international court which has that jurisdiction. This provision can be 
found in the Nuremberg Charter,63 the UN Resolution 95(1), Genocide Convention 
of 1948,64 the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia statute,65 the 
59 S. Zappala “Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes? 
The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation” 12 EJIL (2001) 595 at 597 
60 The 1919 Versailles Treaty, 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, 
Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunals all had provisions which expressed that 
individual criminal responsibility exists irrespective of that individual’s official capacity.  
61 Article 3 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 
(2013) 
62 Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention 1961 states that with respect to acts performed by a person 
entitled to immunities in the exercise of his functions as a member of a mission, immunity shall 
continue to subsist.  
63 Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter 
64 Article 4 of the Genocide Convention 1948 
65 Article 7 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia statute 
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statute and the Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute.66 Despite this established rule in customary international law, a sitting head 
of state has never faced criminal proceedings before an international court. One 
could, however, argue that even though the ICC proceedings against Kenyatta and 
Ruto do not violate the principles of head of state immunity and sovereignty with 
regard to individual criminal responsibility, even though they are both still in office. 
In the Arrest Warrant case, the Court held that Belgium could not exercise 
jurisdiction over the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC because the rules that 
governed the jurisdiction of national courts were not the same as those that governed 
the jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals.67 The court did, however, state 
that immunity from jurisdiction did not equate to impunity with respect to crimes 
committed by that individual. As previously mentioned, immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are two different concepts and 
should be treated as such. Therefore, the immunity upheld in the Arrest warrant case 
does not absolve the individual from being criminally prosecuted.68 Kenyatta and 
Ruto can therefore be prosecuted in either a domestic court in Kenya or the ICC, 
because it has ratified the Rome Statute. 
2.3 Article 27 of the Rome Statute and Kenya’s Domestic Law 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that the Statute shall apply equally to all 
individuals. The official capacity of individuals, in particular that of Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or 
a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under 
the Statute, nor shall it be the grounds for a reduced sentence. States that ratify the 
statute therefore accept that they cannot invoke the rules that govern state immunity 
to avoid the jurisdiction of the court when a crime listed in Article 5 of the Rome 
Statute has been committed by an individual of that state.  
In the Pinochet case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that Pinochet’s actions were 
contrary to international law and therefore his actions could not give rise to immunity 
                                                          
66 Article 6 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statute 
67 Arrest Warrant case supra (n43) at para 59. 
68 Arrest Warrant case supra (n43) para 61. 
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ratione materiae. The fact that Chile had signed the Torture Convention meant that it 
had agreed to outlaw acts of torture and accepted that all other state parties to the 
Convention could exercise jurisdiction over state officials of other member states for 
torture.69 One can therefore argue that Kenya cannot claim that Kenyatta enjoys 
immunity for two reasons. 
Firstly by ratifying the Rome Statute, Kenya accepts the jurisdiction of the court over 
persons who commit the international crimes as set out in Article 5 of the Statute, 
specifically in this case, crimes against humanity. This means that Kenya accepted 
that such a crime was a crime under international law as provided for in Article 1 and 
therefore Kenyatta cannot claim immunity ratione materiae. Secondly, Kenya signed 
and ratified the Rome Statute which means that it accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Court over all of its nationals, including the head of state and other state officials. 
This means that they cannot claim immunity because the ratification of the Rome 
Statute meant that it waived immunity for state officials.  
2.3.1 Kenya’s Municipal Law and the International Crimes Act of 2008 
Kenya’s Constitution provides that the immunity of the President shall not extend to 
a crime for which the President may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya 
is a party which prohibits such immunity.70  
Article 143(1) of the Constitution also provides that criminal proceedings shall not 
be instituted in any court against the President in respect of any act done, or not done 
in the exercise of their powers under the Constitution. 
The International Crimes Act71 is an act of parliament that provides for the 
punishment of certain international crimes, namely genocide, crimes against 
                                                          
69 Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet 
Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte 
Pinochet (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division) 24 March 1999 
 
70 Article 143(4) of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 
71 The International Crimes Act of 2008 
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humanity and war crimes. It enables Kenya to co-operate with the ICC and the 
provisions of the Rome Statute and is binding on the Kenyan government.72  
Article 27(1) of the Act provides that the existence of any immunity or special 
procedural rule attached to the official capacity of any person shall not constitute 
grounds for refusing or postponing the execution of a request for surrender or other 
assistance by the ICC, holding that a person is ineligible for surrender, transfer or 
removal to the ICC or another state, or holding that a person is not obliged to provide 
the assistance sought in a request by the ICC. Kenya’s Constitution therefore enables 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over all of its nationals, regardless of official 
capacity. 
One can therefore argue that despite the unprecedented nature of the proceedings 
brought against Kenyatta and Ruto, the Head of State and his deputy can be held 
individually responsible for crimes against humanity before the ICC based on both 
international and domestic law. The in-action of the Kenyan government to establish 
viable and effective remedies at a domestic level means that the termination or 
absence of ICC proceedings could deny the victims of the 2007 post-election 
violence the right to justice and redress.  
The adoption of the Protocol on the Amendments and the AU’s decision on the ICC 
further demonstrates the unwillingness of African states to hold leaders accountable 
for mass violation of human rights on the continent as they fear that allowing for the 
prosecution of sitting heads of state will undermine the principle of sovereignty. The 
next chapter will look at the relationship between the principle of sovereignty and 
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Chapter Three: 
3. The Protection of Human Rights and Sovereignty
The AU decision on the ICC argued that the proceedings brought against Kenyatta 
and Ruto could undermine the sovereignty, stability, and peace in Kenya and in other 
Member States, as well as reconciliation and reconstruction and the normal 
functioning of constitutional institutions.73 The provision of immunity from 
prosecution of African heads of state and government officials can be considered to 
be a response to ICC prosecutions and an attempt to protect the sovereignty of 
African states. It is therefore important to consider the implications of the AU’s 
decision and on adoption of the Protocol on the Amendments on the protection of 
human rights on the continent. The proceedings brought against Kenyatta and Ruto 
highlight the issues associated with the concept of sovereignty and the universal 
nature of human rights. This chapter will consider the relationship between the 
principle of sovereignty and the state obligations to victims of gross human rights 
violations. 
3.1 The International Protection of Human Rights 
3.1.1 International Human Rights Mechanisms 
The United Nations Charter was the first instrument to recognise the universal 
character of human rights. Article 1 of the Charter provides that the United Nations 
requires cooperation in promoting and encouraging the respect of human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion. Article 55 (c) of the Charter also provides that the United Nations shall 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion.74 Article 
73 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec. 1(Oct.2013), Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 12 
October 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia para 5 
74 Article 55 of the UN Charter also provides that the UN shall promote higher standards of living, full 
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; and solutions of 
international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and 
educational cooperation. 
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56 further provides that member states pledge themselves to take joint and separate 
action in cooperation with the UN for the achievement of the purposes provided for 
in Article 55. These provisions only obligate states to promote human rights and 
cooperate in achieving human rights. They do not, however, obligate member states 
to enforce human rights. These human rights instruments do however, express the 
universal nature of human rights. 
The adoption and ratification of various human rights treaties such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
shows that states, including African member states, accept the common standards 
that should be enforced to protect individuals from human rights violations. Despite 
the general acceptance of the universal nature of human rights, enforcing compliance 
to these standards has proven to be problematic. One problem is the conflict between 
international human rights and sovereignty.  
3.1.2 International Obligations to Prosecute and Punish International Crimes 
Under international law, a peremptory norm, also known as jus cogens, is a 
fundamental principle of general international law which no derogation is 
permitted.75 International crimes with jus cogens status automatically impose 
obligations erga omnes. In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co, the Court held 
that obligations erga omnes are obligations that a state has towards the international 
community as a whole.76 The Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts further provides that States are obligated to end any serious breach 
arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.77 It can therefore be 
argued that states have the obligation to prosecute those that commit these crimes, 
and punish them if they are found guilty. 
75 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.  
76 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited Judgement, I.C.J Reports 1970, p.3 para 33 
77 Article 40 and Article 41 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, UN general Assembly Resolution 56/83, 12 December 2001. 
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State practice and opinio juris shows that states have a duty and obligation to 
prosecute crimes under international law through the establishment of various 
international courts and tribunals from the early 1990s such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),78 the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),79 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)80. The 
statutes of these criminal tribunals reflect that the duty of states to prosecute and 
punish those that have committed international crimes exists in customary 
international law. 
The Rome Statute itself obligates member states to investigate and prosecute those 
that commit the “most serious crimes of international concern”, specifically crimes 
against humanity, genocide, war crimes and aggression.81 As provided for in Article 
1, the International Criminal Court is complementary to national jurisdictions and 
should be considered to exercise its jurisdictions only when national courts have 
failed to prosecute individuals who have committed the crimes provided for in the 
statute. One can therefore argue that the member states have the initial duty and 
obligation to investigate and prosecute individuals that commit international crimes.  
3.2 The Principle of Sovereignty in Africa 
3.2.1 Changing Notions of Sovereignty in Africa 
During the decolonisation period in Africa, the main objective of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) was to end colonisation and apartheid. States sought 
independence and sovereignty and this was reflected in the OAU Charter.  
 
The preamble of the OAU Charter states the members’ determination to safeguard 
and consolidate the “hard-won” independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
                                                          
78 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 
May 1993). 
79 Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc S/RES/955, 8 November 1994 
80 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment 
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002. Endorsed by UN Security Council in SC Res 1400, 
UN Doc S/RES1400, 28 March 2002 
81 Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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states, and to fight all forms of neo-colonialism.82 Article 2(c) provided that one of 
the purposes of the organisation was to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and independence of African states. Member states affirmed to the principles of 
sovereign equality amongst states,83 non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states,84 and respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each state and its 
inalienable right to independent existence.85   
The Constitutive Act of the AU also reflects the importance of the principle of 
sovereignty to African member states. Similar to Article 2(c) of the OAU Charter, 
Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act re-iterates that one of the objectives of the AU is 
to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states. 
Article 4(a) provides that the AU shall function in accordance with the principle of 
sovereign equality and interdependence among member states. Article 4(g) provides 
that the AU shall function in accordance with the principle of non-interference by 
any member state in the internal affairs of another.  
The Constitutive Act does, however, contain various provisions that curb the 
principle of sovereignty. Article 4(h) provides that the AU has the right to intervene 
in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Article 
4(j) also provides that member states have the right to request intervention from the 
AU in order to restore peace and security. Interventions by the AU have mostly 
involved passing resolutions to establish peace keeping missions in member states. 
The Constitutive Act therefore reflects a level of acceptance with regard to 
intervention when human rights violations are occurring or when peace and stability 
is being threatened. Article 4(h) does not, however, specify what type of measure 
should be taken with regards to intervention. The Peace and Security Council of the 
AU is mandated to make recommendations to the Assembly when it has established 
that a crime provided for in Article 4(h) has been committed in a member states and 
                                                          
82 The preamble of the Organisation of African Unity Charter para 5.  
83 Article 3(1) of the Organisation of African Unity Charter 
84 Article 3(2) of the Organisation of African Unity Charter 
85 Article 3(3) of the Organisation of African Unity Charter 
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intervention is needed.86 The final decision to intervene, however, ultimately lies 
with the Assembly either through consensus or a two third majority.87  
3.2.2 Human Rights and Sovereignty in Africa 
The OAU Charter did not create any specific rights and duties with regard to the 
protection of human rights on the continent. The only mention of human rights in the 
Charter is in the preamble and Article 2(e) which provides that one of the purposes of 
the organisation was to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the 
UN Charter and the UDHR. This means that it did not include any sort of judicial 
mechanism or institution to effectively deal with human rights violations or disputes 
in Africa. These disputes where predominantly handled through informal 
mechanisms based on negotiation and consensus amongst states.88  
It was only in 1981 that the OAU adopted the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights89 which reflects internationally accepted human rights norms. The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) was 
established by the African Charter to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure 
their protection in Africa.90 The Rules of Procedure of the Commission provides that 
the Commission can take provisional or interim measures when states parties violate 
human rights.91 Rule 98 provides that the Commission has the power to request a 
state to adopt provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to the victim or 
victims of the alleged violation as urgently as the situation demands.  
The Commission is, however, considered to be weak in terms of being able to 
implement these measures and more specifically because its communications are not 
binding on member states. Such an example is the case which concerned an Ogoni 
                                                          
86 Article 7(e) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union 
87 Article 7(1) of the Constitutive Act of 2000 
88 K Kindinki ‘The proposed integration of the African Court of Justice and the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2007) 15(1) AJICL 138 at 139 
89 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was opened for signature in 1981 and entered 
into force in 1986. It has been ratified by all 53 member states for the AU. 
90 Article 30 of the African Charter 
91Rules of Procedure of the African Commission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights approved during the Commissions 47th Ordinary Session in Banjul from 12-26 May 2010 and 
entered into force on 18 August 2010. 
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activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa. He and other activists were sentenced to death by a special 
tribunal formed by the Nigerian government. The African Commission used its 
power under the Rules of Procedure and requested the Nigerian government to stop 
the execution. This request was, however ignored by the Nigerian government and 
they proceeded to execute Saro-Wiwa and the other activists.92  
In 1998 the Protocol establishing the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
was adopted.93 This court was formed to complement the protective mandate of the 
African Commission.94 This court therefore has the competence to decide all cases 
and disputes submitted to it that concerns the interpretation and application of the 
African Charter, the Protocol, and any other relevant Human Rights instrument that 
has been ratified by the States concerned.95 Further, it is also mandated to provide an 
opinion on any legal matter which relates to the African Charter or any other human 
rights instrument.96 The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights therefore 
provided a legal mechanism for the African Commission when it entered into force.
97 When the court has decided that there has been a violation of peoples’ or human 
rights, it has the power to make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, which 
includes the payment of fair compensation or reparation. More specifically, the court 
has the power to adopt provisional measures to request state parties to abstain from 
causing irreparable harm.98  
In 2000 the Constitutive Act created the African Court of Justice, which is the 
judicial organ of the AU.99 After the creation of the African Court of Justice, there 
92 C Heyns ‘African regional human rights system: The African Charter’ (2003-4) PSLR 679 at  698 
93 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in 1998 and entered into force on 25 January 2004 
after receiving the necessary 15 ratifications from member states. 
94 Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
95 Article 3 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples Rights 
96 Article 4 of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights 
97 Heyns op cit (n92) 699 
98 Article 27 of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
99 The Protocol of the African Court of Justice of the African Union was adopted on 11 July 2003 and 
was enforced 11 February 2009. It has been ratified by 16 member states, namely Algeria, Comoros, 
Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda and South 
Africa. 
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was concern about the proliferation of judicial bodies on the continent.100 It was 
therefore decided that the two courts should be merged under the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2008). The AU decided to 
adopt this new Protocol for an integrated court that would have a General Affairs and 
a Human Rights section each with eight judges.101 The General Affairs section has 
the competence to hear all cases brought to it under Article 28 of the Statute, except 
for those that deal with human and peoples’ rights issues. The Human Rights section 
of the Court only has the competence to hear cases that are related to human and 
peoples’ rights issues.102 In June 2014, the AU adopted the Protocol on the 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights created an additional international criminal law section.103 Article 
28A of the Protocol on Amendments provides that the international criminal law 
section shall have the power to try persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, the crime of unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, 
mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in 
drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources and the 
crime of aggression.   
Similar to the establishment of the African Commission and the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court of Justice and the Protocol on the 
Amendments of the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
provides a platform for intervention when human rights violations have been 
committed or when an individual commits a crime provided for in the statute. One 
can therefore argue that the adoption of these protocols and statutes reflect an 
acceptance and agreement by member states that the principles of non-intervention 
and state sovereignty are not absolute. There however continues to be a gap between 
member states obligations under both regional and international human rights 
instruments and mechanisms.  
100 TF Yerima ‘Comparative Evaluation of the Challenges of African Regional Human Rights Courts 
(2011) 4(2) JPL 120 at 120 
101 Article 16 of the Protocol of the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
102 Article 17(12) of the Protocol of the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
103 Article 6 of the Protocol on the Amendments to the Protocol of the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights replaced Article 16 of the Draft Protocol. 
35 
 
The decision of the AU about the ICC and the adoption of the Protocol on 
Amendments for the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
which provides for the immunity for serving heads of states and government officials 
before the court further demonstrates African states’ inclination to protect their 
sovereignty. It also frustrates efforts to hold those that commit mass atrocities on the 
continent accountable. The following chapter will analyse the Protocol for the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights and will demonstrate how the adoption 
of the Protocol for the Amendment will further weaken the region’s human rights 

















Chapter Four:   
4. Regional and Domestic Human Rights Mechanisms 
The adoption of the Protocol of Amendments not only grants immunity to heads of 
state but also increases the mandate of the existing Protocol of the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights to prosecute international crimes  
The adoption of this Protocol will further frustrate efforts to promote and protect 
human rights on the continent. This chapter will look at the challenges faced by 
Africa’s current human rights system. It will determine that a lack of cooperation 
with the ICC and non-compliance with the Rome Statute will further frustrate the 
continent’s ability to grant justice and redress to victims of human rights violations 
and will also weaken Africa’s human rights mechanisms to promote and protect 
human rights.  
4.1 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the Protection of Human 
Rights in Africa 
As previously mentioned, the decision to merge the African Court of Justice and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was made during a meeting in Addis 
Abba in July 2004 and was prompted by the need to make the two existing Protocols 
for the African Court of Justice and the African Court of Human and People’s Rights 
more efficient by pooling resources onto one judicial organ. As highlighted in 
Chapter one, the AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments to allow for the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over international crimes in Africa.  When this protocol comes 
into force, the African Court of Justice and Human and People’s Right’s will be the 
main judicial organ of the AU and the court will be constituted and function in 
accordance with the Statute.104 There are however a few challenges with regards to 
merging the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights two courts.  
  
                                                          
104 Article 2 of the Protocol for the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted 
1 July 2008  
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4.2 A Merged Court African Court of Justice and Jurisdiction 
The process of replacing one court with another has its fair share of complexities. 
From a legal perspective, there is the complex task of trying to integrate two separate 
courts that have two different Protocols and two different jurisdictions.  
Some scholars initially pointed out that merging the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice would face challenges based on the 
fact that the two courts have two different jurisdictions because they were initially 
established for two different reasons. The human rights court was established to 
protect and promote human rights, therefore its jurisdiction extends to all cases and 
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the African human rights 
Charter, the Protocol establishing the Human and Peoples’ Rights court and all other 
human rights instruments that have been ratified by the state at issue. The Court of 
Justice was established to deal with disputes between states and it has a broader 
jurisdiction which covers all AU treaties and conventions, international law and 
bilateral treaties and conventions between AU member states.105  
The merging of the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ rights would not present such a huge problem with regards to the court’s 
jurisdiction. That is because even though the Human Rights section of the court can 
only handle human and people’s rights cases, the General Affairs section is not 
precluded from hearing cases that have human rights aspects.106 He argue that the 
two sections of the court may share common jurisdiction in some cases. Such an 
example is the competence of the Court of Justice to deal with cases such as the right 
to property.107  
The addition of an international criminal court which has the jurisdiction over 
individuals who commit international crimes would, however, complicate the 
mandate of the court. There is a fundamental difference between the African Court of 
Justice and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights mandates to deal with 
state responsibility as opposed the a mandate of an international criminal court to 
                                                          
105 Kindinki op cit (n88) 141 
106 Kindinki op cit (n88)142 
107 Hansungule op cit (n88) 235 
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deal with individual criminal responsibility. The one is concerned with the state and 
concerned with the individual.  
4.3 Individuals Access to the Court and Article 9(3) 
A weakness of both the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights108 and the 
Protocol for the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is that individuals had 
limited access to the Court.109 The Protocol on Amendments has not increased 
individual and NGO access to the Court. Article 30(f) has been amended to state that 
“African individuals” or “African NGOs” with observer status with the AU or its 
organs or institutions can bring a case directly to the Court, but only with regard to a 
State that has made a Declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive 
cases or applications submitted to it directly. The Court shall not receive any case or 
application involving a state party which has not made a Declaration in accordance 
with Article 9(3) of the Protocol on the Amendments.110  
This provision remains an obstacle for individuals and NGOs who want to bring 
serious human rights violation cases to the Court because they would need to have a 
declaration from the state in question. It is very unlikely that African states are 
willing to expose themselves to being brought to the Court. Such an example is in 
Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal where a citizen of Chad brought a 
claim against the state of Senegal to prevent it from conducting a trial against 
Hissene Hadre, the former president of Chad. The human rights court held that it had 
108 Article 5 of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights only allows individuals to submit 
cases to the court in accordance with Article 34(6) of the Protocol. Article 34(6) provided that at the 
time of ratification, the state shall make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to 
receive cases under Article 5(3). The Court shall not receive any petition under Article 5(3) involving 
a state party which has not made such a declaration.  
109 Article 30 of the Protocol provided that only state parties to the protocol, the African Commission 
on Human and People’ Rights, the Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
African intergovernmental organisations accredited to the AU or its organs, African national human 
rights institutions or individuals or relevant NGOs accredited to the AU or its organs can submit a 
claim to the court when there is an alleged human rights violation.  
110 Article 9(3) of the Protocol on Amendments provides that any Member State may, at the time of 
signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification or accession, or at any time thereafter, 
make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 30 (f).   
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no jurisdiction over the matter because Senegal had not made a declaration under 
Article 34 (6) which would have allowed the court to hear the case.111  
When there is an absence of a declaration from the State in question, another member 
state can make a declaration that an NGO or an individual can submit a case to the 
court. There is still a limitation on which NGOs and individuals can bring cases 
before the African Court of Justice and Human Rights as it is very unlikely that other 
States will give a declaration to allow for the court to have jurisdiction over another 
African state based on the fiercely guarded principle of sovereignty. Therefore, the 
need for a state party to make a declaration limits the opportunities for individuals 
and NGOs to hold states accountable for violating human rights obligations in 
practice. 
4.4 Enforceability of the Court’s Judgements 
On the face of it, decisions of the merged Court will be enforced. Articles 45(1) and 
(2) of the Protocol on Amendments provides that if it is determined that there has
been a violation of crime in the Statute, the Court shall establish in the Rules of
Court principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. The Court may, either upon request or
on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of
any damage, loss or injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on
which it is acting. With respect to its international criminal jurisdiction, the Court
may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation.
Decisions of the court are binding on the parties.112 Where a party fails to comply 
with a judgement, the court shall refer the matter to the Assembly which shall decide 
upon the measures to be taken to give effect to that judgement, and decide to impose 
111 Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
15 December 2009 para 46 
112 Article 46 (1) of the Protocol of the Court of Justice and Human Rights 
40 
 
sanctions on that state.113 However, there is scepticism about the court’s ability to 
enforce these judgements based on the fact that African governments have continued 
to commit gross human rights violations. Such an example is suspension of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal after it handed down 
several judgements against the Zimbabwean government. As a result, it was decided 
that a new Tribunal would be negotiated and that its mandate would be limited to 
interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to inter-state disputes. The 
Tribunal no longer has a human rights mandate and it cannot consider individual 
cases.114 As seen by the lack of political will to carry out the decisions of the SADC 
Tribunal, the merged court is also likely to battle effectively to hold states and 
individuals accountable for their actions.  
With reference to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights, Franz Viljoen 
argues that the Court is ill-equipped to address situations that involve a large number 
of victims. He also points to the fact that a court that runs on a part-time basis is 
incapable of resolving urgent human rights violations and that only individuals who 
can access the court will be granted remedies. Yerima argues that the merged court 
may face the same obstacles when trying to handle cases and making judgements. He 
further states that it is unlikely that imposing sanctions on states is relevant to the 
victims of human rights violations when the court orders the offending state to pay a 
fair compensations but it refuses to comply.115 Heyns also points to the importance of 
trade and other links between state parties as to create the conditions to impose 
sanctions to affect the behaviour of states.116  
Therefore, judgements and decisions can only be effective of there is a level of 
compliance with both domestic and regional human rights norms. Africa’s political 
environment is currently an impediment to the Court’s ability to enforce judgements.  
 
                                                          
113 Article 46 (4) and (5) of the Protocol of the Court of Justice and Human Rights 
114 Pierre De Vos. UCT Law Faculty statement on suspension of SADC Tribunal. 19 September 2012. 
Available online at: http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/uct-law-faculty-statement-on-suspension-
of-sadc-tribunal/, accessed on 19 September 2014 
115 Yerima op cit (n100) 124 
116 Heyns op cit (n92) 701 
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4.5 Funding and Resources for Regional Human Rights Mechanisms 
The preamble of the Protocol of the Court of Justice and Human Rights states that 
the state parties recall “their commitment to take all necessary measures to 
strengthen their common institutions and to endow them with the necessary powers 
and resources to carry out their missions effectively”. The rapid proliferation of 
institutions in Africa and the need to rationalise the two existing courts and make 
them more cost effective was the main reason behind the decision to merge the Court 
of Justice and the Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Funding of the court is, 
however, considered to be a challenge. 
African states have a poor record of providing adequate funding for its human rights 
institutions and this could become highly problematic when it comes to the 
efficiency of the merged Court. Not only are funding and resources important for the 
Court but so is the proper management of the resources that are available. 117It has 
been noted that one of the problems faced by the African Commission has been 
funding and this has made it less effective in being able to promote human rights 
throughout Africa. It is also considered to be under resourced.118 The commission 
has at various times been forced to rely on extra budgetary funding from donors due 
to the insufficient funds it received from the AU.119 This made certain states criticise 
the commission for being influenced by foreign donors.120 It was strongly 
recommended that the Member states of the AU support the commission both 
morally and financially or else AU would be undermining the African Charter.121  
The merged court is most likely to face the similar challenges. Funds are needed to 
finance various aspects of the merged court such as a new building, provide registry 
staff, lawyers, a library and a document centre.122 . Sufficient human resources and 
finances will be needed to make sure that Court is able to effectively carry out its 
                                                          
117 Heyns op cit (n92) 701. 
118  UO Umozurike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Suggestions for more 
effectiveness’ (2007) 13 ASICL 179 at 188. 
119 GM Wachira ‘African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Ten years on and still no justice’ (2008) 
Report from Minority Groups International 10. 
120 In 2008 the AU made a decision to increase the budgetary allocation to the African Commission 
by over 400% to end its dependency on erratic donor funding. 
121 Yerima op cit (n100) 125 
122 Yerima op cit (n100) 124 
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mandate.123 Failure by member states to provide for the court will be a huge 
detriment to its ability to effectively function. 
In addition to the more apparent funding issues, the introduction of an international 
criminal section will increase the costs of the Court. It has been documented that 
international courts and tribunals operate at extremely high costs. Since the 
establishment of the ICC in 2008, for example, the Court had spent approximately 
US$900 million by the 2012.124 The inclusion of a third section will therefore require 
large investment. This is in contradiction to the underlying motivation for merging 
the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights as 
a way of cutting costs and saving resources to make a single court more efficient. 
Failure efficiently to fund the Court will make it difficult for the court to operate in 
practice.  
4.6 The Effectiveness of Africa’s Human Rights Mechanisms 
The preamble of the Protocol states that the establishment of an African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights shall assist in achieving the goals pursued by the African 
Union. It further states that the objectives of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights can be attained by the establishing a judicial organ to supplement 
and strengthen the mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights as well as the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child. 
From a human rights perspective, there is a concern that that there will be a lack of 
focus on the mandate of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights which is 
solely to deal with human rights violations on the continent. Various international 
human rights bodies criticised the merger of the two courts, stating that the AU has 
abandoned the idea of creating a strong court that could effectively deal with human 
rights issues on the continent, as envisioned by the mandate of the African Court on 
                                                          
123 Wachira op cit (n119) 26 
124 Jon Silverman, ‘Ten Years, $900m, one verdict: Does the ICC cost too much?’ BBC News Magazine. 
14 March 2012. Available online at: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17351946, accessed on 9 
September 2014. 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights.125 The adoption of the Protocol on Amendments further 
to include international crimes could further dilute the focus on human rights on the 
continent which the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights was initially 
mandated to promote and protect. The high costs that will be associated with the 
international criminal court may also result in the divergence of funds away from the 
human rights section in an attempt to fund the international criminal court section.  
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights faces many challenges that could 
impede its ability to be a strong judicial organ that can effectively deal with the 
continent’s human rights violations and be able to hold member states accountable 
for these abuses. An efficient judicial organ will greatly help with the promotion and 
protection of human rights and will also have the effect of enhancing justice and rule 
of law in Africa.126  
There are surely positive aspects of the merged Court and it can be seen as a sign of 
progress for Africa’s human rights system. Yerima acknowledges that it will 
strengthen the universality norm of human rights and also help loosen the rigid 
principle of state sovereignty. The court will also help with the growth and 
development of human rights jurisprudence in Africa.127  The success of the court, 
however, mainly lies with the political will of the member states of the AU. There 
needs to be an adequate and widespread level of compliance with human rights 
norms by a significant amount of state parties on the domestic level for there to be a 
more efficient and stronger regional system.128 Heyns argues that if the level of 
respect for human rights norms on the domestic level is low and domestic courts are 
also ineffective, there will be very little hope for a functioning regional enforcement 
mechanism.129 
The efficiency of this court can also be bolstered if states have the courage to make 
the special declarations under Article 9(3) that will allow individuals and NGOs 
direct access to the court when human rights violations occur. This will greatly help 
125M Hansungule ‘African courts and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in A 
Bosl and J Diescho Human Rights in Africa: Legal Right and their protection (2009) 236 
126 Kindinki op cit (n88) 145 
127 Yerima op cit (n100) 121 
128 Heyns op cit (n92) 700 
129 Heyns op cit (n92) 700 
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in giving victims the chance to be approach the courts and be granted remedy for 
these violations. It will also help in holding states accountable for the crimes that 
they commit. Further, it is important that member states abide to their obligations 
under the African Charter and also comply with their financial obligations to make 
sure that the African commission and the Court are sufficiently funded.130  
Africa’s political and legal environment limits access to justice and redress for 
victims of human rights violations. African heads of states and government officials 
are most likely to be the perpetrators of massive human rights violations on the 
continent. A lack of AU cooperation with the ICC and the adoption of Article 46A 
Bis of the Protocol on Amendments will further limit the avenues for human rights 
victims to access justice and redress and would mean that these individuals would 
not be held accountable for these actions. This would therefore be in violation of AU 
state obligations to promote and protect human rights. 
The next chapter will therefore look at how the AU decision on the ICC and the 
adoption of Article 46A Bis of the Protocol on Amendments is unlawful because it 
promotes impunity on the continent. It will also argue that the AU is in contravention 
of the Constitutive Act.  
130 Yerima op cit (n100) 126 
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Chapter Five: 
5. The African Union and Kenya’s Obligations under International Law
The African Union and Kenya’s actions are arguably unlawful under both regional 
and international law because they endorse impunity on the continent. Following the 
adoption of the Protocol on Amendments, Amnesty International’s Africa Director 
for research and advocacy stated that: 
‘At a time when the African continent is struggling to ensure that there is 
accountability for serious human rights violations and abuses, it is impossible to 
justify this decision which undermines the integrity of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, even before it becomes operational. We are deeply disappointed 
that African Heads of State and government have failed to provide the leadership 
needed to ensure justice for victims of crimes under international law, opting instead 
to shield themselves and future generations and leaders from prosecution for serious 
abuses.’131 
This chapter will firstly consider the legality of the AU’s decision on the ICC as a 
regional body on the international plane. It will consider the consequences in 
international law of the decisions or resolutions passed by a regional body. Secondly 
it will argue that the actions of the AU are in contravention of the Constitutive Act 
and provisions of the Rome Statute. Thirdly, it will determine that Kenya’s actions 
are in contravention of Kenya’s regional and international obligations to fight 
impunity and hold individuals responsible for committing international crimes.  
5.1 The African Union and International Legal Personality 
In order to determine the legality of the African Union’s decision on the International 
Criminal Court and the adoption of Article 46A Bis of the Protocol on Amendments, 
131 Global Justice, “A step towards impunity for grave crimes: AU approves immunity for those in 
power”, 3 July 2014. Available online at: http://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2014/07/03/a-step-




it is important to determine the characteristics of the African Union and its legal 
personality. 
5.1.1 Characteristics of the African Union 
The Organisation of the African Union was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU’s main purposes were to promote the unity and solidarity 
of African states; to coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a 
better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism; and to promote international 
cooperation, having due regard to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.132 The decolonisation process and the independence of African states 
made the purposes of the OAU obsolete. It was therefore important to establish an 
organisation which was competent in dealing with the historical processes occurring 
and the emerging challenges of the continent.  
The African Union was established under Article 2 of the Constitutive Act which 
entered into force on 26 April 2001. The Assembly of the African Union is the 
supreme organ of the organisation and is composed of Heads of State and 
government or their duly accredited representatives.133 The powers and functions of 
the Assembly are to determine the common policies of the AU; receive, consider and 
take decisions on reports and recommendations from the other organs of the AU; 
consider requests for membership of the AU; establish any organ of the Union; 
monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of the Union as well ensure 
compliance by all Member States; adopt the budget of the Union; give directives to 
the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war and other emergency 
situations and the restoration of peace; appoint and terminate the appointment of the 
judges of the Court of Justice; and appoint the Chairman of the Commission, deputy 
or deputies and Commissioners of the Commission and determine their functions and 
terms of office.134 
 
                                                          
132 Article 2 of the Organisation of the African Union Charter 
133 Article 6 of the Constitutive Act of 2000 
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5.1.2 The Legal Personality of the African Union and its decision on the ICC 
The issue of international legal personality was considered in Reparations for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.135 The Court had to determine 
whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an international claim against 
another state. The Court first considered whether the UN Charter gave the United 
Nations international personality. If it did have such personality, it would be capable 
of “availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its members”.136   
The Court held that the UN Charter defined the position of member states in relation 
to the UN by: 
i. requiring them to give it assistance in any action undertaken by it
ii. accepting and carrying out the decisions of the Security Council
iii. authorizing the General Assembly to make recommendations to the members
iv. giving the organisation legal capacity and privileges and immunities in the
territory of each of its members; and
v. providing for the conclusion of agreements between the organisation and its
members137
The Court also noted that the UN was a political body that carried out political tasks 
which covered the maintenance of international peace and security, the development 
of friendly relations amongst nations, and the achievement of international 
cooperation in solving problems that have an economic, social, cultural or 
humanitarian character, as stated in Article 1 of the Charter.138 The court therefore 
concluded that the UN was intended to exercise and enjoy the functions and rights on 
the basis of possessing international personality and the capacity to operate upon an 
international plane.139 
Considering the above case, it can be argued that the AU has international legal 
personality. Similar to the UN it is a political body which consists of a permanent 
135 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion of 11 April 
1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174.  
136 Reparations for Injuries Suffered supra (n135)178 
137 Reparations for Injuries Suffered supra (n135) 178 -179 
138 Reparations for Injuries Suffered supra (n135) 179 
139 Ibid 
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assembly of Heads of State and government. The Constitutive Act gives the 
Organisation international personality as it requires that its members allow for the 
supreme organ of the AU to carry out functions to determining the common policies 
of the AU; to receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations 
from the other organs of the AU; and to monitor the implementation of policies and 
decisions of the Union as well ensure compliance by all Member States. Therefore, it 
can be argues that the Constitutive Act confers rights and duties to the AU. The 
organisation would not be able to carry out these functions if it was void of legal 
personality.  
The AU’s legal personality is, however, limited. Unlike the UN, the AU only 
consists of African member states of which all are also members of the UN. 
Therefore, the AU only creates rights and duties for member states of the 
organisation. Despite the fact that the AU has international legal personality, it can 
be argued that the AU can only exercise its powers regionally and not internationally. 
Therefore, the decision made by the AU cannot be enforced internationally. 
5.2 Impunity in Africa and the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
5.2.1 The ICTR and the SCSL and Jurisprudence on Impunity 
International criminal tribunals in Africa have made positive contributions to the 
jurisprudence on individual criminal responsibility and the rejection of impunity in 
Africa. The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR)140 was the first 
international tribunal to prosecute individuals who had committed international 
crimes in Africa. The Rwandan government requested the Security Council to 
establish this tribunal to prosecute the individuals that were responsible for genocide 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law that were committed in 
the territory of Rwanda and in neighbouring states between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994.141 The tribunal was set up because there were no other politically 
feasible remedies for victims of the genocide.142  The ICTR was the first 
140 The ICTR was established by the Security Council under VII of the UN Charter. UN Doc. S/RES/955, 
8 November 1994 
141 Preamble of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda statute 
142 L.J. van den Herik The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International 
Law, 31  
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international criminal tribunal to prosecute and convict a former state official in the 
Kambanda case.143  This judgement confirmed that state immunity could not be 
invoked as a defence for state officials who had committed international crimes. It 
also confirmed that international criminal tribunals could exercise jurisdiction over 
state officials.144  
The ICTR was followed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Following 
international crimes committed in the territory, the government of Sierra Leone 
requested the UN to help establish a court to prosecute and punish individuals 
responsible for committing crimes against humanity and war crimes.145 Unlike the 
ICTR, which was established under Chapter VII, the Security Council established the 
SCSL146 under Chapter VI of the UN Charter as a hybrid criminal court which 
applies both international and domestic law.147  
Under Article 1(1) of the SCSL statute, the court has the power to prosecute persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in territory of Sierra Leone 
since November 1996. The statute also gives the court the power to exercise 
jurisdiction over individuals who commit crimes against humanity148, serious 
violations of humanitarian law149 and Sierra Leonean domestic law.150 
The SCSL further contributed to the jurisprudence on individual criminal 
responsibility. It provided that the official position of an accused person, including 
that of head of state, did not relieve that person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate their punishment.151 Pursuant to this provision the SCSL, under Article 15, 
143 Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 4 September 1998.  
Jean Kambanda, who was the Prime Minister of Rwanda was prosecuted and convicted for the crime 
of genocide and other international humanitarian law.  
144 George William Mugwanya “The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda to 
the Development of International Criminal Law” in Chacha Murungu & Japhet Biegon (eds) 
Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa 91 
145 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of August 2000 (UN Doc S/RES/1315)  
146 The SCSL started operating on 1 July 2002. 
147 Chacha Murungu.  “Prosecution and Punishment of International Crimes by the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone” in Chacha Murungu & Japhet Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa 98 
148 Article 2 of the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
149 Article 4 of the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
150 Article 5 of the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
151 Article 6.2 of the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
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brought a case against the head of state of Liberia, Charles Taylor for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other serious violation of international humanitarian 
law.152 He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 50 years in prison.  
The establishment of the ICTR and the SCSL has allowed Africa to contribute to 
international criminal law and the jurisprudence which supports the notion that 
individuals with official capacity cannot be granted immunity when they have 
committed an international crime. 
5.2.2 Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
Article 4 (o) of the Constitutive Act provides that the AU shall function with respect 
of the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political 
assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities. AU actions have, however, 
shown to be in contravention of this provision.  
Such an example is the AU’s actions with regards to the ICC case against Sudanese 
President Hassan Omar Al Bashir. Al Bashir was accused of committing crimes 
against humanity, genocide and war crimes in Darfur by the prosecutor of the ICC. 
On 4 March 2009, an arrest warrant was issued against Al Bashir for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity153 and on 3 February 2010, the arrest warrant was amended 
to include genocide.154 There was a distinct outcry against the issuing of a warrant 
from the Sudanese government, national governments and regional organisations. 
The AU Peace and Security Council called the Prosecutors’ request for an arrest 
warrant a threat to peace in the region and appealed to the UN Security Council to 
                                                          
152 Article 15 provides that the prosecutor is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for various violations of international humanitarian law 
and crimes under Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 
1996. The Prosecutor acts independently as a separate organ of the court.  
153 Steve Odero “Politics of international criminal justice: The ICC’s Al Bashir and the African Union’s 
Neo-Colonial Conspirator Thesis” in Mrungu and Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in 
Africa (2011) 146-147  
154 The Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence at the time to prosecute Al Bashir for 
genocide at the time that the warrant was issued. Pursuant to Article 58(6) of the Rome Statute, the 
Appeals Chamber reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber decision to reject the genocide charge.  
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suspend proceedings and investigations against Al Bashir for a period of 12 months 
under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.155  
At the 13th AU Summit in July 2009, the AU further voted to not cooperate with the 
ICC when the arrest warrant was issued. It expressed its concern that the indictment 
against the Al Bashir had “unfortunate” consequences on the delicate peace 
processes underway in Sudan. It also expressed that the indictment undermined the 
ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the early resolution of the conflict.156 Al Bashir 
has not been arrested and still remains at large. Since the arrest warrant was issued, 
Al Bashir has visited various African countries, including Kenya, Central African 
Republic and Chad. These African states that are party to the Rome Stature have an 
obligation to cooperate with the Court.157 The lack of cooperation from state parties 
has impeded the Court’s ability to apprehend Al Bashir since his arrest warrant was 
issued.  
The AU’s decision about its relationship with the ICC and Article 46A Bis is a 
further attempt by African states to protect its leaders from prosecution when they 
have committed international crimes. This is in direct violation of Article 4(o) of the 
Constitutive Act as it promotes impunity instead of “rejecting” it. Granting immunity 
to sitting heads of state and senior officials will undoubtedly create an incentive for 
those who are or have committed international crimes to hold on to power as a way 
of avoiding prosecution. As seen by the Al Bashir case, African states lack the 
political will to fight against impunity in Africa.  
5.3 Legal Implications of the African Union’s Conduct 
5.3.1 The Legal Implications of the AU’s decision on the ICC 
It is clear that the AU’s decision on its relationship with the ICC is in contradiction 
with the AU’s stated commitment to reject impunity and prosecute those that commit 
155 Annalisa Ciampi “The Proceedings against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of their 
suspension under Article 13 of the ICC Statute” JICJ 6 (2008) 885 at 886 
156 Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XII) Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, 12 October 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
157 Lutz Oette “Peace and Justice, or Neither? The Repercussions of the Al Bashir Case for 
International Criminal Justice in Africa and Beyond” JICJ 8 (2010) 345 at 360 
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international crimes, regardless of official capacity.  It is also in direct violation of 
Article 27 of the ICC Statute which 34 AU member states are party to, including 
Kenya. The AU’s decision is in no way legally binding for the ICC or African states 
who have ratified the statute. Therefore, the decision will have no legal impact on the 
ICC’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction in African states that have ratified the Rome 
Statute. 
5.3.2 Legal Implications of Article 46A Bis of the Protocol on Amendments and the 
Rome Statute 
The decision to grant immunity for sitting heads of states and senior government 
officials in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights can be considered to be an 
attempt to shield presidents from prosecution when they are alleged to have 
committed human rights violations.  
Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the Court will exercise its jurisdiction 
based on the complementarity principle. The ICC is considered to be court of last 
resort. Therefore the court is supposed to only investigate a case when domestic 
courts have failed to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who is alleged to have 
committed a crime provided for the in the Rome Statute.  
The Rome Statute can be read to mean that it can exercise its jurisdiction over 
nationals of member states, regardless of official capacity, when a domestic court has 
failed to act.  In Belgium v Senegal, Senegal had referred a case against Hissene 
Habre158 to the AU in 2006 in an attempt to delay prosecution and extradition to 
Belgium.159  The ICJ, however, held that Senegal’s referral of the matter to the AU 
could not justify Senegal’s delays in complying with its obligations under Article 
7(1)160 of the Torture Convention.   
                                                          
158 Habre was the President of Chad from 7 June 1982. He was overthrown on 1 December 1990 
when he requested political asylum in Senegal. In 2000, Chadian nationals lay a complaint against 
Habre in a Senegal Court for alleged human rights crimes during his presidency. Habre argued that 
Senegal had no jurisdiction and no legal basis for the proceedings. In 2009, a Belgian national of 
Chadian origin then filed a complaint with civil party application in Belgium for torture and genocide. 
159 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) Judgement of 
20 July 2012. I.C.J Reports 2012 p. 422 para 23 
160 Article 7(1) of the Torture Convention requires that member states take all measures necessary 
for the implementation of the Convention as soon as possible.  
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One can therefore argue that the African Court’s provision to grant immunity to 
sitting heads of state and senior government officials will have no bearing on the 
ICC’s ability to exercise jurisdiction when a domestic court of a state that has ratified 
the Rome Statute has failed to prosecute an individual who is alleged to have 
committed a human rights. That is because that state has accepted the jurisdiction of 
the ICC to prosecute individuals in that circumstance. As stated before, the adoption 
of this protocol by member states of the Rome Statute would cause them to be in 
direct conflict and breach of Article 27.  
5.4 The AU’s support for National Prosecutions in Kenya 
The AU had previously supported and endorsed the East Africa region’s request for a 
referral of the ICC investigations and prosecutions in relation to the 2007 post-
election violence in Kenya, in line with the principle of complementarity, to allow 
for a national mechanism to investigate and prosecute the cases.161 It can, however, 
be argued that national jurisdictions do not have the political will to prosecute heads 
of state and government officials who commit international crimes. This results in 
the promotion of impunity on the continent.  
5.4.1 Kenya’s Failure to Establish Domestic Mechanisms 
As provided for in Article 1 of the Rome Statute, domestic courts have the primary 
responsibility to prosecute individuals who have committed international crimes, 
based on the complementarity principle. The Kenyan government has failed to 
institute any proceedings against Kenyatta and Ruto in the past six years with respect 
to alleged crimes committed during the post-election violence in 2007. There have 
also been no adequate investigation of the crimes committed during this period 
which left 1 100 people dead and 600 000 displaced across the country. As a result, a 
large number of victims have not received compensation or reparations for injuries, 
the loss of family members or the loss of property. 162 It has been reported that some 
                                                          
161 Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Doc. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XX1). Assembly of the Union. Twenty-First Ordinary Session 26-27 May 2013, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
162 Amnesty International. ‘Kenya Victims still seeking justice for the post-election violence” 15 July 
2014. Available online at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-victims-still-seeking-justice-post-
election-violence-2014-07-15, accessed on 13 August 2014 
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victims have received cash, varying from US$116 to US$4 650, while others have 
simply received tins of maize as reparations.163  
Victims have also been robbed of the opportunity of seeing the perpetrators of the 
violence face justice. Following the aftermath of the post-election violence, Kenyan 
authorities stated that they were willing and able to prosecute cases domestically. In 
2008, the Ministry of Internal Security drew up a list of cases and ordered the police 
to speed up investigations, specifically those that were linked to serious offences. 
The ministry also directed that cases should be ranked according to their gravity so 
that the suspects could be charged expeditiously. Those that were charged in court 
were never brought to trial to be convicted.164  
In October 2008, the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence released 
the Waki Commission report which recommended the establishment of a special 
tribunal mandated to prosecute those that had perpetrated crimes during the post-
election violence. The commission also submitted a list of alleged perpetrators and 
evidence to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities whilst the special court was to 
be established.165 On 16 December 2008, Kenyan President, Kibaki and Prime 
Minster Odinga, agreed to prepare and submit a Bill that would establish the Special 
Tribunal. Parliament, however failed to enact the bill that would establish the 
tribunal on numerous occasions. An attempt to amend the constitution to allow for 
the tribunal was objected by parliament on the basis that the matter should be 
transferred to the ICC to avoid internal interference of proceedings.166 The failure to 
establish a domestic mechanism to deal with this matter prompted the Panel of 
Eminent African Personalities to hand over the cases to the ICC prosecutor.167  
Various shallow attempts have been made to establish a domestic mechanism.168 In 
November 2012, for example, the Judicial Service Commission approved 
                                                          
163 Natalie Ojewska “Uhuru Kenyatta’s Trial” A case study in what’s wrong with the ICC” The Global 
Post, 6 February 2014. Available online at:  
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/kenya/140206/uhuru-kenyattas-trial-
case-study-whats-wrong-the-icc, accessed on 7 August 2014 
164 Human Rights Watch. ‘“Turning Pebbles” Evading Accountability for Election Violence in Kenya” 
December 2011, 17 – 18. 
165 Ibid 22 
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recommendations to establish an International Crimes Division of the High Court to 
deal with mid and lower level perpetrators of crimes during the post-election 
violence of 2007 and crimes committed during the1992 and 1997 election period.169  
5.4.2 Kenya and the International Criminal Court Proceedings 
The ICC case against Kenyatta has been faced with many difficulties. Despite an 
initial statement made by then President  Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga stating that Kenya remained fully committed to cooperating with the ICC 
within the framework of the Rome Statute and Kenya’s International Crimes Act,170 
Kenya has failed to live up to its obligations in an attempt to shield its leaders from 
prosecution.  
Article 93(1)(b) of the Rome Statute provides that state parties shall comply with 
requests by the Court to provide assistance with the taking of evidence, including 
testimony under oath, and the production of evidence, including expert opinions and 
reports necessary. The court has not been able to collect important evidence due to a 
lack of cooperation by the Kenyan government in submitting records and documents 
that are pertinent to the case. Kenyan authorities, for example, have failed to grant 
prosecutors access to Kenyatta’s banking records which could ultimately prove that 
he had made payments to the perpetrators who carried out the post-election 
violence.171  Kenyatta’s trial has been postponed several times because of the high 
number of witnesses that have withdrawn from the case. Reports have suggested that 
allies close to Kenyatta have adopted tactics such as “paying off witnesses: 
threatening the families of witnesses who have accepted witness protection; 
                                                          
169 Betty Waitherero. “Can the International Crimes Division prosecute Kenya’s PEV cases?” The Daily 
Nation, 8 February 2014. Accessed on 22 February 2014. Available online at: 
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/International-Crimes-Division-bring-accountability/-
/1949942/2197978/-/format/xhtml/-/ch6vpg/-/index.html 
170 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Statement on the Situation in Kenya. 
14 August 2013. The Hague. Available online at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/14_August_2013_Statement_JCCD-SM_(2).pdf, accessed on 12 
November 2013 
171 Simon Allison. “Kenya: ICC should temporarily withdraw charges against Kenya’s President”. The 
Standard Digital News, 19 July 2014. Available online at: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000128841/icc-should-temporarily-withdrwawal-charges-
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publicising the identity of witnesses; and violence against witness, including 
mysterious disappearances.”172   
In 2013, the Kenyan government submitted amendments to the Rome Statute in 
accordance with Article 121. Kenya proposed add a third paragraph to Article 27 
which would allow serving heads of state, their deputies and anybody acting or is 
entitled to act as such to be exempt from prosecution during their current term of 
office.173  
The Kenyan government has also unleashed a diplomatic campaign to rally support 
against the ICC by uniting African leaders who are often accused of committing 
human rights violations by amplifying perceptions that the ICC is biased against 
Africa and that they infringe on the principles of state sovereignty.174 This is 
particularly damaging because the ICC relies on the support of its member states. 
Kenya’s political campaign has no doubt had an impact on AU decisions and legal 
frameworks and his is having a negative effect on the ICC’s ability to effectively 
prosecute this case.175  
Domestically, the Kenyan parliament adopted a motion for repealing the 
International Crimes Act which incorporated the Rome Statute into municipal law in 
an attempt to ultimately withdraw from the Rome Statute. As argued in Chapter one 
a withdrawal does not relieve the State from any of its obligations of the Statute 
whilst it was a state party. The State is therefore still obligated to cooperate with the 
court in connection with any criminal investigations and proceedings that it has a 
duty to cooperation with and that had commenced prior to the date the withdrawal 
came in to effect. The motion to withdraw can therefore be considered to be part of 
Kenya’s campaign against cooperation with the ICC and an effort to protect 
prosecution of its head of state and deputy.  
172 Ibid 
173 Submission by the Republic of Kenya on Amendments to Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court for Consideration by the Working Group on Amendments. C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-
XVIII.10. 14 March 2014. 
174 Ojewska op cit (n171) 
175 Allison op cit (n171) 
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5.4.3 Impunity as a barrier to human rights protection 
The AU and the majority of its member states have adopted legal and policy 
mechanisms to protect victims from human rights violations and to hold those that 
commit human rights violations accountable. The preamble of the AU’s decision on 
Africa’s relationship with the ICC re-iterates the organisations “unflinching 
commitment to fight impunity, promote human rights and democracy and good 
governance in the continent.”176  
Despite these sentiments, the AU has failed to consider the victims of the 2007 post-
election violence. Article 4(h) provides for the right of the AU to intervene in a 
member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, specifically war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The 
final decision to intervene, as highlighted in chapter 2, ultimately lies with Assembly 
of states. African states have however, proven to refrain from intervening in other 
member states based on the notion of sovereignty, even when gross human rights 
violations have taken place. Instead, the AU has shielded those who are responsible 
for crimes against humanity to evade prosecution without due regard for the victims 
of those violations. The actions of the AU, and in particular Kenya, can be deemed to 
be unlawful because they promote impunity.  
176 Preamble of the Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec. 1(Oct.2013), Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 12 
October 2013 para 2 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that the African Union’s decision on its relationship with the 
international criminal court and the adoption of Article 46ABis of the Protocol on 
Amendments are contrary to principles of international law, namely Article 27 of the 
Rome Statute and state obligations to promote and protect human rights. These 
actions, however, demonstrate that the African states lack a real commitment to 
ensure that victims of serious human rights violations have access to justice and 
redress. These actions also demonstrate a lack of political will to hold African 
leaders accountable for committing gross human rights violations on the continent.  
The actions of the African Union in no way effect the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court. The court can still investigate and prosecute sitting heads of state 
and government officials in Africa in accordance with the Rome Statute. However, 
the proceedings brought against Kenyatta and Ruto highlight that the lack of 
cooperation from states who have ratified the Rome statute could limit the court’s 
ability to investigate and prosecute these officials. A lack of cooperation with the 
ICC and a provision that allows for the immunity of heads of state will further limit 
avenues for victims of human rights violations to access justice and redress. The 
situation in Kenya has highlighted the difficulties associated with accessing both 
domestic and regional courts for justice and redress. The African Union’s actions are 
therefore a betrayal of victims of human rights violations. 
The African Union’s actions are also violation of Article 4 of the Constitutive Act 
and its own human rights provisions. On a continent where impunity is rife, AU 
actions will undoubtedly encourage heads of state and government officials to hold 
on to power as a way of avoiding prosecution. It has been argued that heads of states 
and government officials are most likely to be the perpetrators of mass human rights 
atrocities, specifically genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These 
demonstrate to African leaders that they can commit gross human rights violations 
without any consequences or repercussions. 
It is therefore crucial that African states demonstrate political courage and resist the 
pressure to shield leaders from prosecution for serious international crimes in the 
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